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At first sight, an accurate description of the state of the universe appears
to require a mind-bogglingly large and perhaps even infinite amount of in-
formation, even if we restrict our attention to a small subsystem such as a
rabbit. In this paper, it is suggested that most of this information is merely
apparent, as seen from our subjective viewpoints, and that the algorithmic
information content of the universe as a whole is close to zero. It is ar-
gued that if the Schro¨dinger equation is universally valid, then decoherence
together with the standard chaotic behavior of certain non-linear systems
will make the universe appear extremely complex to any self-aware subsets
that happen to inhabit it now, even if it was in a quite simple state shortly
after the big bang. For instance, gravitational instability would amplify the
microscopic primordial density fluctuations that are required by the Heisen-
berg uncertainty principle into quite macroscopic inhomogeneities, forcing
the current wavefunction of the universe to contain such Byzantine super-
positions as our planet being in many macroscopically different places at
once. Since decoherence bars us from experiencing more than one macro-
scopic reality, we would see seemingly complex constellations of stars etc.,
even if the initial wavefunction of the universe was perfectly homogeneous
and isotropic.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking features of the universe we inhabit is its complex-
ity. When going swimming after setting up an over-night hydrodynamics
batch job on the computer, it is easy to start marveling over the system of
currents, waves and vortices in the pool, and ask oneself silly questions like
“how on earth can nature calculate all this in real time?”. Quite apart from
the fact that many of the non-linear partial differential equations that na-
ture appears to integrate with ease are numerically ill-posed as initial value
problems, exhibiting chaotic behavior, the sheer number of bytes required
to store the initial data for a system such as Niagara falls at a reasonable
resolution are mind-boggling. Indeed, if we were to take classical General
Relativity seriously, then space is a continuum locally isomorphic to R3,
which means that to describe the location of something we need to specify
three real numbers. Of course, this already constitutes an infinite about
of information — to specify a generic real number completely would be
equivalent to specifying an infinite number of seemingly random decimals.
Likewise, to specify a quantity such as the electric field E at even a sin-
gle point would involve specifying real numbers, i.e., an infinite amount of
information. This has disturbed many authors in the past, and has been
one of the motivations for attempts to replace continuum physics by some
discrete alternative, e.g. [1,2,3].
In this paper, we will instead take the viewpoint of the old phrase “it’s
just a figment of your imagination”, and argue that continuum physics can
be maintained without involving infinite quantities of information, and in-
deed without invoking any new physics whatsoever. The argument will
basically go as follows.
• The wave function of the universe shortly after the big bang had some
quite simple form, which can be described with very little algorithmic
information.
• By the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, this initial state involved
micro-superpositions, microscopic quantum fluctuations in the various
fields.
• The ensuing time-evolution involved non-linear elements that exhib-
ited chaotic behavior (such as the well-known gravitational instabil-
ity that is held responsible for the formation of cosmic large-scale
structure), which amplified these micro-superpositions into macro-
superpositions.
• In the no collapse version of quantum mechanics, the current wave-
function of the universe is thus a superposition of a large number of
states that are macroscopically extremely different (Earth forms here,
Earth forms one meter further north, etc).
• Since macroscopic objects inevitably interact with their surroundings,
the well-known effects of decoherence will prevent self-aware subsets of
the universe (such as us) from perceiving such macro-superpositions.
• The net result is that although the wavefunction of the universe con-
tains almost no algorithmic information (we can specify it by sim-
ply giving the initial wave function and the Hamiltonian), and will
retain for instance translational and rotational symmetry from the
initial data, we will experience an asymmetric universe that appears
extremely complex.
In other words, the ensemble of all branches in the current macro-superposition
is simple to describe, but to describe any one element of the ensemble (be-
cause of decoherence, that is all we will observe), requires an enormous
amount of information. This is much like the fact that one needs very little
information to describe a real-valued random variable with a simple prob-
ability distribution, but an infinite amount of information to describe any
one realization of it. We will now discuss the elements of this argument in
somewhat greater detail.
2. ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION AND
INITIAL CONDITIONS
The algorithmic information content [4-18] (also known as the informa-
tion content, the algorithmic complexity or algorithmic randomness) of a bit
string s is defined as the length (in bits) of the shortest program for a uni-
versal computer that produces s as output. For instance, the information
content of a string of 109 random bits would be about 109 bits, whereas
that of a string of 109 zeroes would be quite small. Subtle details such
as assumed capabilities of the “universal computer” are discussed in detail
in the literature, and are irrelevant to the present discussion. The above
definition is straightforward to extend to wider classes of objects than bit
strings. Integers are of course bit strings when written in binary form, and
the definition of the information content of a real number is analogous. The
algorithmic information content of a wavefunction ψ is customarily (e.g.,
[17]) defined as the length of the shortest computer program that given any
point r in the configuration space and a prescribed accuracy ǫ will eval-
uate ψ(r) to this accuracy. Similarly, the information definition is readily
widened to encompass the other mathematical objects that will recur in this
paper.
As an example, consider an image of the Mandelbrot set. We can equiv-
alently think of it as a scalar field in the complex plane, whose value deter-
mines the color of the image at each point (say black or white). To the lay
observer, it might appear to contain a vast and perhaps even infinite amount
of information. However, since we can describe the Mandelbrot set it in a
single sentence, simply as the set of points c in the complex plane for which
the iteration z 7→ z2 + c will not diverge when we start with z = 0, a short
program can determine whether a given point belongs to the set or not, and
the algorithmic information content of the image is thus correspondingly
small.
2.1. The Sense in Which the Whole is Less than
a Sum of its Parts
In the case of the Mandelbrot set, the source of the discrepancy between
apparent and actual (algorithmic) information content was chaos, caused
by nonlinear dynamics. We will return to this in Sec. 3, as this is one of the
two things that we will argue causes the abundance of apparent information
around us. The second source is related to quantum symmetry breaking,
and will be elaborated upon in Sec. 4. Loosely speaking, the apparent infor-
mation content rises when we restrict our attention to one particular element
in an ensemble, thus losing the symmetry and simplicity that was inherent
in the totality of all elements taken together. A uniform probability distri-
bution on the unit interval [0, 1] has a very small algorithmic information
content, since the distribution function simply equals unity on this interval
and vanishes outside of it. Now let us draw one number from this distribu-
tion. It can be written out with infinitely many decimals, so to describe it
requires an infinite amount of algorithmic information unless we are lucky
enough to draw something simple like a rational number, 1/
√
2, 1/π, etc.,
and this rarely happens — indeed, it is easy to prove that the probability of
drawing a number with a finite amount of algorithmic information is zero.1
In short, any one realization contains more information than the prob-
ability distribution itself. Similarly, any one generic real number between
zero and one contains more information than the totality of all of them —
the algorithmic information content of a single number is infinite, whereas
the entire set [0, 1] can be generated in lexicographical order by quite a
simple computer program [16].
2.2. The Initial State of the Universe
In modern cosmology, the field of density fluctuations in the universe (see
e.g. [19]) is usually modeled as a random field δ(r), and it is often assumed
that this field was homogeneous, isotropic and Gaussian early on, long be-
fore non-linear structures such as galaxies formed. This means that the
entire field (or rather the entire ensemble of all fields) can be completely
described by merely one single function of one variable, ξ(r), the correla-
tion function, which specifies the correlation of the field values at two points
separated by a distance r. If this function were given by a simple analytic
1Any computer program of finite length can be thought of as a rational
number between 0 and 1 by interpreting its bits as binary decimals preceded
by “0.”. Since the set of all rational numbers on [0, 1] has Lebesgue measure
zero, the result follows.
expression, then this particular aspect of the initial data would thus have a
very small algorithmic information content. There is of course a catch here:
the ensemble of all random fields is merely a convenient statistical concept,
and few cosmologists would take this literally enough to believe that there
are in fact infinitely many universes with the same correlation function, us
merely being ignorant as to which one we happen to inhabit. However, as
will be argued in the two following sections, the no-collapse interpretation
of quantum mechanics provides a formalism which is in many ways simi-
lar to that of random fields, and in addition is supposed to describe actual
macroscopic realities that exist in superposition.
A familiar example is the vacuum state of any field theory, which could
be interpreted as a superposition of an infinite number of different field con-
figurations. Although this is usually not useful when computing half-lives,
cross sections etc., such a vacuum can be characterized in a way quite anal-
ogous to that in which random fields are defined, the only major difference
being that all probabilities are replaced by complex-valued amplitudes. If
the vacuum is homogeneous and isotropic, the description simplifies greatly
just as in the above-mentioned random field case. The key point is that
the algorithmic information content of the vacuum state of any field the-
ory that we can define is finite, since by merely defining the field theory,
we automatically define its vacuum. Although we know virtually nothing
about quantum gravity and the state of the universe less than a Planck
time after the big bang, it does not appear particularly outrageous to pos-
tulate that the universe was once in something resembling a vacuum state
of a more complete field theory than we presently know of (incorporating
quantum gravity), or at least in some sort of state that would be equally
simple to describe. For the rest of our argument, we will simply assume
that state of the universe at some early time exhibited so much symmetry
that it contained only a small and finite amount of algorithmic information.
3. CHAOS AND SYMMETRY BREAKING
Classical physics provides us with an abundance of familiar examples where
the apparent information content of a system rises although the algorithmic
information content does not, because of chaotic behavior. Water approach-
ing Niagara Falls and a window hit by a football are two familiar examples.
In both of these cases, the dynamics amplifies microscopic differences in
the initial data into visible macroscopic differences. Here we will center our
discussion around an example of gravitational instability.
3.1. The Classical Cosmological Density Field
Assuming that the laws of physics that govern the time-evolution are known,
the algorithmic information content of the final state is of course not much
greater than that of the initial state, since the program that specifies the
final state can can simply contain the program that computes the initial
state together with the appropriate numerical routines (for integration of
the partial differential equations of nature, say). The fact that the time
required for the computation might be prohibitive is irrelevant here, since
algorithmic information refers only to the size of the computer program,
not to the time it takes to run it.
As an example, let us assume that we know the field of cosmological
density fluctuations at an early time as well as the physics that describes
its time evolution. Let us also assume that the initial data are those of
a standard cosmological structure formation scenario, i.e., that the initial
fluctuations are very small, corresponding to a nearly uniform density, with
an appropriate power spectrum (see, e.g., [19]). To keep things simple, we
can assume that all matter is collisionless and that no other forces than
classical gravity are at work (including further elements of realism would of
course make the system even more chaotic). This uniquely specifies the state
of the matter distribution today, and we know from numerical simulations
that despite the simplicity of the initial data, this state would be extremely
complex, with highly non-linear clumping on a wide range of scales. In other
words, gravity alone creates apparent complexity of the type we mentioned
when discussing the Mandelbrot set. More precisely, gravitational dynamics
causes chaotic behavior, in the sense that a pair of very similar initial data
sets could produce results that are macroscopically different — recall that
gravitational dynamics exhibits chaotic behavior even in the much simpler
case of the three body problem.
3.2. The Quantum Case
To be able to appeal to the example of gravitational dynamics for our main
argument, we need to take this one step further, beyond classical physics. If
the initial state corresponded to exactly uniform density, then so would the
final state. Since the real world has a non-zero Planck constant, the actual
initial state in our simple gravity problem is of course described by a wave-
functional, ψ, that associates a complex amplitude to each configuration of
the field of density fluctuations, δ(r), and the time-evolution is governed
not by the classical equations of motion for δ(r), but by the Schro¨dinger
equation for ψ. As is well known, classical statistical mechanics, where a
probability distribution in phase space evolves over time according to the
Liouville equation, exhibits many similarities with quantum statistical me-
chanics, where a Wigner function evolves in the same phase space [20,21].
In this phase space picture, there are two familiar differences between the
classical and quantum-mechanical descriptions:
1. The quantum time evolution is slightly different, except for Hamilto-
nians that are of quadratic or lower degree in positions and momenta.
2. Certain classically allowed sets of initial data are forbidden by the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
Although of great relevance in many microphysical problems [22], the first
of these two differences is irrelevant for our present discussion, as the correc-
tion terms are small, and moreover have the effect of making the phase-space
time-evolution even more non-linear and chaotic. Thus for our purposes, we
can get qualitatively correct results by ignoring this first difference, and sim-
ply replacing the quantum treatment by the treatment in terms of classical
random fields which has become standard in cosmology, and for which we
already know the answer. The second difference is the crucial one here, since
as we will see, it implies that the initial ψ cannot simply correspond to the
trivial solution of δ being constant with vanishing time derivatives. For a
single particle, the uncertainty principle implies that ∆x∆p ≥ h¯/2, which
means that the compulsory p 6= 0 components will cause a localized wave
packet to gradually “spread out”. For the familiar textbook problem of a
pencil perfectly balanced on its tip, the uncertainty principle analogously
forbids the trivial classical solution where the pencil remains balanced for-
ever. Our gravitational instability example is analogous, except that we
are dealing with a quantum field δ(r) with an infinite number of degrees
of freedom. The uncertainly principle simply bounds from below the prod-
uct of ∆δ(r) with the spread in the corresponding conjugate momentum,
thus forbidding the trivial classical solution with no fluctuations (where δ
retains a constant value throughout space with no spread, corresponding to
the balanced-pencil solution).
In summary, the initial field δ(r) must be in a superposition of hav-
ing several different values at each point, and will therefore change due to
gravity. We thus draw the following conclusion: since any one initial field
configuration with small fluctuations will eventually evolve into a messy and
lumpy mass distribution, the initial state ψ, being a superposition of such
states, will evolve into a superposition of messy and lumpy states.
3.3. Symmetry is Still not Broken
It should be stressed that although a type of symmetry breaking has oc-
curred for each individual element of the superposition (approximate trans-
lational invariance has been broken), the wavefunction ψ retains all the
symmetry that it originally had, since gravity itself is translationally and
rotationally invariant. If the the initial ψ had exact translational invari-
ance (which means that the one-dimensional probability distribution for
δ(r), the two-dimensional probability distribution for [δ(r1), δ(r2)], etc. were
all invariant under a shifting of the coordinate system), then the resulting
wavefunction today will have this same property. Where is all the irregular
gravitational clumping hidden? The answer is to be found in all sorts of
intricate long-range correlations that did not exist in the initial ψ. For an
extreme example, suppose that the time-evolution regrouped all the mass
into homogeneous lumps the size of Earth. Then the correlation between
δ(r1) and δ(r2) would be almost perfect if r1 and r2 were separated by one
meter, since if r1 is in a planet, r2 probably is as well. ψ would nonethe-
less be translationally invariant, corresponding to superpositions of planets
at different locations, with all locations given equal weight. In summary,
non-linear dynamics with chaotic behavior will create a type of hidden com-
plexity within the wavefunction ψ, but not itself cause symmetry breaking.
In the following section we will argue that the symmetry breaking is ap-
parent, as well as discuss why it appears to be broken in a way that favors
“classical” states.
4. UNIVERSALLY VALID QUANTUM MECHANICS
4.1. A Brief Review of the No Collapse Interpretation
Although quantum mechanics has proven to be an astonishingly successful
theory by any standards, the issue of how it is to be interpreted has caused
heated debate ever since it was created some 70 years ago. At the center of
the controversy stands the so called collapse postulate, according to which
the time-evolution of the wavefunction is occasionally not governed by the
Schro¨dinger equation, but described by a discontinuous random jump, a so-
called “collapse”. This postulate was introduced to explain the apparently
random outcomes of certain quantum measurements, but is completely un-
necessary according to the Everett interpretation [23-28], also known as the
“many worlds interpretation”. The debate continues about the underlying
philosophical and ontological issues (see, e.g., [29,31]), but these are not cru-
cial to the argument in this paper. All that is needed here is the assumption
that quantum mechanics is universally valid:
• The time-evolution of any isolated system is governed by the
Schro¨dinger equation.
This is what Albert refers to as the “raw theory”. Thus all isolated systems,
not merely microscopic ones, are assumed to obey quantum mechanics, be
they planets, human beings or the entire universe. In other words, there
is no wave function collapse built into the theory itself. Rather, this phe-
nomenon is assumed to arise automatically on a phenomenological level.
Everett argued that a generic observer will subjectively experience an ap-
parent wavefunction collapse consistent with the familiar quantum probabil-
ities. The basic idea is illustrated by the following simple example. Suppose
Ange´lica prepares n different spin−1
2
silver atoms to have spin up in the x-
direction, and then proceeds to measure their spin in the z-direction with a
Stern-Gerlach apparatus. She writes down the results in the form of binary
digits, 0 denoting “down” and 1 denoting “up”, with a decimal point in
front of it all, so that the outcome of the entire set of measurements can be
codified as a real number x on the interval [0, 1]. For instance, if n = 4, the
outcome “up-down-down-up” would correspond to x = 0.1001. In the limit
where n→∞, there is thus a one-to-one correspondence between outcomes
and real numbers on [0, 1]. In the Everett interpretation, the final state for
the system consisting of both Ange´lica, her laboratory and her silver atoms
is thus a superposition of orthogonal states that we can label by numbers
x, such that state x corresponds to the atoms having precisely the spins
given by the decimals of x and Ange´lica having experienced exactly these
measurement results. The key point realized by Everett is that almost all
Ange´licas in this final superposition will have measured spin up 50% of
the time, in exactly the same sense that almost all real numbers on [0, 1]
have 50% of their binary digits equal to one (the set of those that do not
has Lebesgue measure zero). Thus almost all Ange´licas in the final super-
position will find the outcome of their experiment in agreement with the
standard quantum probabilities. The generalization to finite n and more
generic probabilities than 50% is also presented by Everett, and in every
case, he finds that almost all observers in the final superposition will find
their experimental results in agreement with the probabilities that would
arise from the collapse hypothesis. Certain aspects of Everett’s arguments
are still controversial, but as mentioned, these technical details are of no
importance for the main argument in the present paper.
4.2. How Universal Quantum Mechanics Causes
Apparent Complexity
The above example brings us back to the argument of Section 2.1, except
that we are now discussing reality2 rather than physical models. To rephrase
the argument in quantum language, there is relatively little algorithmic
information in the final state ψ. To describe any one particular outcome
in the grand superposition, however, would require n bits of information,
and we can for arguments sake choose n to be enormous. Thus although
reality (ψ) remained as simple as it was before the experiment, a generic
Ange´lica in the final superposition will be staring at a piece of paper with a
long and seemingly random string zeroes and ones and consider this to be
lots of information. Thus subjectively, as experienced by a self-aware subset
of ψ (Ange´lica), the complexity and algorithmic information of the world
has increased, although objectively, when viewing the mathematical object
ψ from outside, the algorithmic information of ψ stayed constant.
This is precisely what happens in the example of cosmological structure
formation discussed in the previous section. Even if nonlinear dynamics
produces a wavefunction ψ where a planet is in a superposition of being
centered in two different places, separated by one meter, this is of course not
2In this paper, we use the word “reality” to denote that which is described
by ψ. In other words, we think of all elements of the a superposition as
being equally real, bearing in mind that in any particular element of the
superposition, there may be an observer who subjectively feels that merely
that element is real. (This is of course merely an issue of semantics, so all
that matters is that we clearly state how we choose to use various words,
deferring to philosophers the question of which usage is preferable.)
what a self-aware subset of ψ would experience. Rather, after the observer
had interacted with the planet (by absorbing electromagnetic radiation re-
flected from it, say), ψ would for all practical purposes be a superposition
of two orthogonal states, each corresponding to the planet having a definite
location and the observer finding it in that same location. In other words,
when we gaze into the night sky and see stars all over the place (in defi-
nite positions, but positions that appear somewhat random), this is exactly
what we would have expected to see. However, in the picture put forward
here, the seemingly large information content in these stellar positions (in-
formation that has by now filled many volumes of astronomy publications)
is merely information in the eyes of the beholder. It is not real information
in the algorithmic sense, and would never enter in a compact description of
ψ itself.
4.3. The Role of Decoherence
The no collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics leaves a crucial ques-
tion unanswered [30,31,32]: why is the position operator r̂ so special? In
other words, why is it that we tend to find macroscopic objects in (ap-
proximate) eigenstates of r̂ in particular, even though there are infinitely
many other Hermitean operators (for instance r̂+ p̂) whose eigenstates in-
volve macro-superpositions (such as the above-mentioned superposition of
a planet being in two macroscopically distinct places)? A breakthrough on
this issue was not made until more than a decade later [33], and it took
another decade until the question was definitely answered [34,35]. The an-
swer, usually referred to as decoherence (see [36] for a recent review), lies in
the fact that macroscopic systems are virtually impossible to isolate from
their surroundings. It can be shown that the net effect of this inevitable
interaction is to suppress off-diagonal elements of the spatial density matrix,
which means that to a subjective observer, a macroscopic object will for all
practical purposes appear to have a definite position.3 It is straightforward
to quantify the decoherence effect caused by various interactions that we
know to occur [37,38], and one finds that even such relatively weak effects
as scattering of microwave background photons and (on earth) solar neutri-
nos will keep an object the size of a bowling ball localized to within a small
fraction of an atomic radius.
Decoherence is quite crucial to the main argument in this paper. If
Ange´lica had measured the spin of her silver atoms in the x-direction in-
stead, she would simply have measured “up” every time. The quantum
creation of apparent complexity that was described above of course requires
that we are measuring an observable that the quantum system is not already
in an eigenstate of. Thanks to decoherence, our classical world is very posi-
3The deeper question of why the calculations always end up favoring
the position operator is related to the unexplained empirical fact that the
Lagrangians of nature seem to be spatially local (as opposed to being local
in for instance Fourier space).
tion centered, so our minds are constantly keeping track of where things are
located. As we saw in the previous section, nonlinear gravitational evolu-
tion will automatically convert a translationally invariant initial state into a
state where macroscopic objects are not in position eigenstates, but rather
in a superposition of being in many different places. This is why we should
expect to find apparent complexity in the sky. Electromagnetic, weak and
strong forces of course all produce non-linear time-evolution as well, so we
have no right to be surprised by finding apparently complex structures on
more everyday scales either — after all, non-linear dynamics is so ubiquitous
that it has been jocularly compared to “the zoology of non-elephants”.
5. DISCUSSION
We have argued that although the universe appears to contain an enormous,
perhaps even infinite, amount of information, this impression is nonetheless
consistent with the assumption that its algorithmic information content is
quite small, even if no new physics whatsoever is invoked. In short, reality
could in fact be much simpler than it appears, with its apparent plethora
or complex structures such as trees, fountains and rabbits. The enormous
discrepancy between apparent and actual information content would have
been caused by an interplay of several well-known effects:
• Non-linear dynamics evolved quantum states that were initially only
microscopically different into quantum states that were macroscopi-
cally different.
• Well-known decoherence effects ensured that only macroscopically
“classical” states could be perceived by self-aware subsets of the uni-
verse (such as us), so for all practical purposes, the wavefunction of
the universe is in a superposition of a such states.
• Although the total wavefunction still contains as little algorithmic
information as it did in the beginning (assuming that the laws of
physics that govern its time evolution are known), any one element of
this superposition (which is all that we can subjectively experience,
because of decoherence) will display the enormous complexity brought
about by the chaotic non-linear evolution.
Thus even if both the laws of physics and the initial conditions exhibit so
much symmetry that they are easy to describe, we would not expect most of
these symmetries to be manifested in what we see when we open our eyes.
For instance, we would not expect the matter distribution around us to be
translationally invariant even if the initial wave function was.
5.1. Why Universal Quantum Mechanics is Needed
It should be emphasized that if the wavefunction really collapses, then the
main argument of this paper does as well. In other words, in those interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics where the Schro¨dinger evolution is replaced
by some random process while Ange´lica measures her spins, leaving a final
wavefunction ψ corresponding to merely one definite sequence of outcomes,
the algorithmic information of ψ will in fact increase. The reason that it is
no longer conserved is of course the randomness itself, since causality has
been lost and the initial data no longer suffice to specify the final wave-
function. Rather, the randomness will increase the algorithmic information
with one bit per spin measurement.
5.2. Why Chaos is Needed
Why does the above argument fail in the absence of non-linear4 dynamics?
Roughly speaking, the apparent symmetry breaking caused by quantum
mechanics and decoherence applied only to macro-superpositions, whereas
the only superpositions that are required to exist initially by the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle is micro-superpositions. Thus for our argument to
work, we need some process to evolve the initial micro-superpositions into
macro-superpositions. In our example of cosmic structure formation, we
needed a mechanism that converted the microscopic density fluctuations of
the early universe into planets etc. that were in superpositions of being in
many macroscopically separated positions at once. Converting micro into
macro is of course the very essence of chaotic dynamics, which exponentially
amplifies microscopic differences in initial data as time passes.
5.3. What about Computability?
In the definition of algorithmic information, the universal computer is of
course required to produce the desired output in a finite amount of time.
In other words, the current wavefunction of the universe should be com-
putable from the initial state and the equation of motion, to any prescribed
accuracy, in a finite number of program steps, As long as the equations of
motion are non-chaotic, this will be achievable by integrating the partial-
differential equations of motion numerically, using some time-step ∆t that is
4Here and throughout we refer to a system as linear if its Hamiltonian is
at most quadratic. This corresponds to the classical equations of motion in
phase space being linear. Thus the phase-space distributions at two different
times are simply related by a linear canonical transformation. For such
quantum systems, the Wigner functions at two different times are related
by this same linear canonical transformation. This type of linearity should
not be confused with that of the Schro¨dinger equation, which is of course
linear (in ψ) however nonlinear the Hamiltonian may be.
chosen small enough to fulfill the accuracy requirement. If the equations of
motion are chaotic, however, this simple-minded approach of course fails in
practice, since the computed final state would be significantly wrong unless
an absurdly high numerical precision was used, the number of significant
digits required growing exponentially with the duration between the initial
and final time. Fortunately, the relevant quantity in our case is the universal
wave-function ψ, whose evolution is non-chaotic, since it is governed by the
linear Schro¨dinger equation. Thus ironically, although the chaotic nature of
the corresponding classical dynamics was crucial to a different aspect of our
argument, the non-chaotic nature of pure quantum evolution is important
as well.
In summary, whereas quantum states themselves evolve non-chaotically,
the reduced density matrices describing subsystems do evolve chaotically,
and both of these formal facts are essential to our argument.
5.4. What about the Initial State?
It should be emphasized that although we assumed that the initial state of
the universe had quite a small algorithmic information content, our argu-
ment about apparent complexity holds more generally, in the sense that an
observer will always perceive the universe to be more complicated than it
actually is. Roughly speaking, the observer’s description (as given by the
appropriate reduced density matrix) will inherit all the complexity of the
big bang, and in addition include substantial amounts of extra “illusory”
complexity.
5.5. What about Entropy?
The subtle relationship between entropy and various measures of informa-
tion has been discussed by many authors (see e.g. [16,17,40] for reviews),
often in connections with Maxwell’s infamous demon. It has been empha-
sized [39] that neither a state of minimum disorder (such as a perfect crys-
tal) nor maximum disorder (such as an ideal gas in thermal equilibrium)
corresponds to what we with a course-grained description would describe
as complex. Rather, the hallmark of perceived complexity is the so called
“depth”, which often reduces to the difference between the coarse-grained
and fine-grained entropies [39]. This provides an alternative way summariz-
ing the arguments above: the fine-grained entropy of the universe remains
constant, but non-linear dynamics and the apparent symmetry-breaking
brought about by quantum mechanics and decoherence increase the coarse-
grained entropy that we perceive, thus increasing the depth, the apparent
complexity.
In addition to these processes, the course-grained entropy of any open
system will of course increase in accordance with the second law of ther-
modynamics, even in classical physics, as the system gradually becomes
correlated with ever more distant parts of the universe — see e.g. [40] for
a recent review, including a discussion of when the entropy can decrease.
However, such an entropy increase merely reflects an increase in our igno-
rance about the system in question, not an increase in the complexity of the
system. Consider a visible particle suspended in a static liquid, undergoing
Brownian motion. If we observe it at some definite position, and then look
away from our microscope, our subjective probability distribution for the
particle position will widen over time as
√
t. Yet when we eventually look
again, thereby reducing our ignorance and thus reducing the entropy, the
system we see appears neither more nor less complex than it did to begin
with.
5.6. Would it be Testable?
Is this entire discussion merely a useless metaphysical digression without
any experimentably testable consequences? Not necessarily. Ever since the
big bang theory became firmly established, the problem of understanding
the initial conditions has aroused interest. For instance, one of the main
goals of modern cosmology is to accurately measure the power spectrum
of density fluctuations. By comparing the fluctuations measured by large
galaxy redshift surveys to the fluctuations measured in the cosmic microwave
background radiation, strong constraints can be placed on models for the
formation of large scale structure in the universe. Most of the currently pop-
ular models (cold dark matter, mixed dark matter, baryonic dark matter,
etc.) simply predict how a “primordial” power spectrum would evolve due
to various microphysical effects, which means that all these models must
be supplemented with an assumption about the form of this primordial
spectrum. One popular prediction of what the primordial power spectrum
should be is the inflationary scenario (see e.g. [19] for a review), but many
other suggestions have been put forward as well, including ones appealing
to quantum gravity, e.g. [41,42]. The point is that the initial conditions
prevailing shortly after the big bang are not necessarily in the realm of
metaphysics, and may turn out to have measurable consequences. If this
turns out to be the case, then it will perhaps be possible for us to use our
knowledge of the mechanisms described above to make inferences about the
initial conditions from observational data, and if these initial conditions are
indeed simple enough to have a small information content, we may even be
able to determine them with reasonable accuracy.
5.7. Would it be Good News or Bad News?
A pessimistic way of summarizing the scenario put forward in this paper
would be as yet another step in the human humiliation that began with
the Copernican revolution. After being dethroned from our position in the
center of the universe half a millennium ago, forced to accept that we are
orbiting the sun rather than vice versa, our human egos have received a
series of devastating blows. We have now been demoted further, to orbiting
a rather average star a rather average distance from the center of a rather
average galaxy, our sun being but one star amongst 1011 others in but one
galaxy amongst at least that many more. Alas, the humiliation shows no
signs of abating. In the cold dark matter scenario and variants thereof,
the bulk of the matter in the universe is conjectured to be non-baryonic,
snobbishly refusing to interact with us much at all, leaving us as some sort of
ignored fringe minority. Our human self-confidence has been deflated on the
mental side as well. Darwin told us that we were descended from amoebas
and differed from other organisms not in a qualitative way but merely in a
quantitative way. Freud claimed that we did not even understand ourselves
all that well, and Skinner argued that we had no free will, being more like
organic computers that could be programmed by suitable conditioning. Last
year, Garri Kasparov was beaten by a chess computer. Now we are arguing
that even the intricate structures that are the subjects of our thoughts,
dreams and efforts in life, everything from our loved ones to our parking
tickets, are perhaps more aptly described as illusions, as manifestations of
the fact that our minds experience the grandeur of reality merely from an
extremely limited frog perspective. More precisely, we are arguing that it is
the grandeur itself that is merely apparent, since the complete description of
the wavefunction of the universe is orders of magnitude simpler than what
we see when we open our eyes. In short, reality would be much more banal
than it appears to be.
However, we can just as well choose to summarize our discussion on
an optimistic note. First of all, once we have abandoned the notion of us
humans playing a central role in the universe, and forced ourselves to find
a raison d’eˆtre elsewhere, yet another step away from the limelight clearly
makes little difference. The everyday reality to which we wake up in the
mornings will of course remain the same whether we change our ontological
views or not — no amount of philosophizing will make those parking tickets
go away. If we thus restrict our value judgements to empirical considera-
tions, the picture put forward here would have quite positive implications
for our ability to do science in the future. The information content of the
world around us naively appears to completely dwarf the sort of information
quantities that we humans can store and process. However, if the algorith-
mic information content of the universe is indeed quite small, then perhaps
we need not despair when faced with the vast and complex world around
us. Rather, this would raise the slight hope that we humans may one day
be able to understand it.
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